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1 For a discussion of  how other, critical approaches within IR address the question, see Fisher Onar 2013; 2018.
As the West retrenches and new powers emerge, students of  international relations are well positioned to address an outstanding question: 
How to thrive in a multipolar world? The question—and 
the answers which we bring to bear—resonate beyond 
geopolitics. This is because the task of  living together 
in diversity is arguably the greatest analytical as well as 
normative challenge facing world politics more broadly 
(Fisher-Onar, Pearce, and Keyman 2018). 
In this intervention, I address the question of  living 
together in a multipolar world from an IR perspective. 
I suggest that dominant approaches like realism and 
liberalism, which favor Western-centric categories and 
large-N data, fail to capture important dynamics. I then 
make the case for family resemblances as a method of  
cross-regional comparison which enables the analyst to 
examine cases typically boxed into different area studies 
compartments. Finally, I operationalize the approach 
towards a baseline for comparison across Eurasia’s 
revisionist former empires: China, Russia, Iran, and 
Turkey. I argue that by thus establishing a basis for 
comparison, we uncover patterns relevant to prospects 
for cooperation as well as conflict in a post-Western 
world. 
Multipolarity: Views from the IR Tower
Attempts from within IR to make sense of  
multipolarity are often informed by positivist approaches 
like realism and liberal institutionalism.1 Realist tools 
include concepts like revisionist versus status quo powers 
and their quest for status (Davidson 2006; Volgy et al. 
2011), hegemonic stability, its eclipse and preventive 
war (Gilpin 1988; Levy 2011), the balance of  power 
(Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann 2004; Kaufman, Little, and 
Wohlforth 2007), and power transition (Tammen 2008). 
Such work offers a bird’s-eye view and can help elucidate 
major mid-range questions like prospects for war 
between the retrenching United States and rising China. 
Yet, there are limitations for the study of  multipolarity. 
First, realism privileges substantive questions relevant to 
great power—especially American—interests like nuclear 
proliferation (Kang 2003). This goes hand-in-hand with 
a tendency to ignore phenomena that appear pervasive 
to emerging powers—including nascent superpower 
China—like racialized hierarchies in world order. 
Second, realists, like many others across the North 
American IR academy, tend to favor macro-quantitative 
methods which aggregate large numbers of  randomized 
cases. By glossing over differences between cases, and 
ignoring outliers, the claim to universal purchase becomes 
possible (Berg-Scholsser 2018). The trade-off  is that 
studies do not register nuance (Ahram 2013). As a result, 
the large-N analyst may overlook major motivational and 
behavioral patterns, including phenomena with causal 
force. A case in point is the game-changing role which 
counterintuitive alliances can play in and across national 
contexts (Fisher Onar and Evin 2010; Hart and Jones 
2010). 
An alternative approach is liberal institutionalism. 
Liberals are more likely to open the black box of  domestic 
politics and thus to access non-Western readings of  
world order. However, liberals’ concern is often less with 
non-Western perspectives than with the capacity of  the 
Western-led liberal order and its institutions to co-opt 
challengers (Owen 2001; Ikenberry 2008). The primacy 
placed on Western concerns is evident in the intense but 
short-lived “hype” (Zarakol 2019) around the BRICS, 
which dissipated when these emerging economies 
wobbled by the mid-2010s (Hurrell 2019). Nevertheless, 
the relative share of  economic and normative power 
enjoyed by the United States and Europe continues to 
diminish. As anger at relative decline finds expression 
in phenomena like Brexit and the Trump presidency, 
the capacity of  the Western-led liberal order to absorb 
challenges under multipolarity remains in question, a 
concern brought into dramatic focus by the COVID-19 
pandemic.
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Multipolarity:  
Views from—and across—Area Studies
If  realist and liberal frames for reading multipolarity 
tell only part of  the story, how to better access rising 
powers’ perspectives? Given that the challenge is how to 
thrive in a world of  many poles, the ability to triangulate across 
poles is valuable. Engagement of  other perspectives can 
foster epistemological and pragmatic openings for more 
pluralistic research and foreign policy practices (Saylor, 
this issue; Acharya 2011; Fisher Onar and Nicolaidis 
2013). That said, cross-regional triangulation is useful even 
if  the analyst rejects the critical project of  decentering 
international relations. Strategic reconnaissance of  other 
cultures for defensive or offensive purposes is a well-
established tradition. Examples include the adventures 
of  British and Russian imperial agents in the nineteenth-
century “great game” over Eurasia, and the foundation 
of  area studies within the US academy during the Cold 
War to inform policy makers about non-Western regions 
(King 2015).
These (neo-)colonial origins notwithstanding, area 
studies today offers interdisciplinary insights into the 
cultures, economies, political systems, and foreign 
policies of  non-Western powers. It leverages the 
nuanced knowledge of  historians, linguists, geographers, 
anthropologists, sociologists, and diplomats, among 
others. Area studies attends, moreover, to issues of  
geopolitical significance from migration and social 
movements to political economy and the sociology of  
religion. In each of  these arenas, field experts are likely to 
draw conclusions that are both more accurate and more 
contingent than those of  counterparts in the IR tower. 
Such sensitivities can be useful in the management of  
multipolar complexity. 
Yet area studies are no panacea. Respect for 
complexity is a normative and a methodological 
commitment; it can yield rich, often counter-intuitive 
insights, but also insistence on the sui generis nature of  
each case. This tendency is reinforced by the structural 
division of  labor between area compartments within the 
academy. Thus, experts on one world region (like the 
Middle East) rarely converse with specialists on or from 
other regions (like East Asia), nor develop cross-regional 
expertise. The upshot is that important insights may be 
difficult to translate across regional specializations, much 
less to disciplinary IR or political science. 
The challenge, then, is to mediate between problem-
driven respect for case or cross-case specificity on 
one hand, and broader relevance on the other. Enter 
Comparative Area Studies (CAS), defined by Ahram, 
Köllner, and Sil (2018, 3) as any “self-conscious effort” to 
simultaneously: (i) “balance deep sensitivity to context… 
us[ing] some variant of  the comparative method to 
surface causal linkages that are portable across world 
regions; and, (ii) engage ongoing research and scholarly 
discourse in two or more area studies communities 
against the backdrop of  more general concepts and 
theoretical debates within a social science discipline.”
As Sil (2018) suggests, CAS often entails cross-
regional, contextualized small-N comparisons. With 
regard to emerging powers, this intermediate level of  
analysis helps to capture variance within and across 
actors in different regions, teasing out cross-cutting 
patterns. For example, the ability to recognize that a 
power struggle is unfolding in X state where moderates 
are outmaneuvering hardliners, and to compare and 
contrast such struggles across X, Y, and Z states affords 
very different insights—and policy prescriptions—than 
reading states as monolithic blocks (Fisher Onar 2021).
Family Resemblances and Eurasia’s 
Former Empires: China, Russia, Iran, 
Turkey
There are many ways to operationalize cross-
regional comparison as showcased in this symposium 
and the edited volume by which it was inspired. As a 
contribution to the toolkit, I invoke the notion of  
“family resemblances,” defined as cases that share 
significant overlapping elements even though they may 
not uniformly display one common feature. As Goertz 
(1994) suggests, family resemblances offer a handle on 
concepts which are “intuitively understandable,” such as 
electoral authoritarianism, but difficult to formulate in 
terms of  “exact specification or definition” due to the 
presence of  overlapping features across cases rather than 
identical “hard cores” (25). 
The notion of  family resemblances serves 
comparative area studies because it enables the analyst 
to escape the straitjacket of  Cold War regional categories 
which tend to emphasize the role of  geography over 
history, sociology, or economics in shaping outcomes 
(Pepinsky, this issue). By thus assessing resemblances 
across regional foci one can identify similarities and 
differences for fresh insights into actors that are 
otherwise lumped together (in large-N studies) or kept 
separate (in single- or area-bound small-N studies). Such 
patterns, in turn, can be probed towards refining the 
operative concept, hypothesis generation, identification 
of  necessary and sufficient causal mechanisms, and 
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inductive theory-building (Goertz and Mahoney 2012). 2
To demonstrate, I turn to a cross-regional, 
contextualized small-N set of  cases which demand a 
medium level of  expertise in return for a medium level 
of  portability. The four cases—China, Russian, Iran, and 
Turkey—are geostrategic but rarely compared. Spanning 
the Eurasian landmass from the eastern Mediterranean 
to the Pacific, they have figured prominently in Western 
grand strategy since at least the great game between 
Britain and Russia. From the “Heartland” thesis of  
Anglo-American strategists in the early twentieth century 
through to Robert Kaplan’s 2018 book The Return of  Marco 
Polo’s World, these states have long served as the “other” 
of  European and American geopolitical imaginaries 
(Morozov and Rumelili 2012; Fettweis 2017). At the 
dawn of  multipolarity, such anxieties are exacerbated 
by these countries’ revisionist behavior across the vast 
Eurasian geography (Mayer 2018).  
However, operationalizing comparison is challenging. 
This is due to cross-case discrepancy when assessed via 
conventional IR or area studies criteria like material 
capacity or cultural attributes. Thus, for the IR scholar, 
Turkey and Iran are, at most, multi-regional middle 
powers with spoiler potential, while Russia is arguably 
a declining great power, and China a rising superpower. 
One can draw on the flourishing regional powers literature 
to address these differences (Nolte 2010; Parlar Dal 
2016), but the fact remains that these four states present 
an “apples, oranges, and cherries” problem, as it were, 
regarding their comparative magnitude. Meanwhile, for 
the area studies analyst, historical, linguistic and sundry 
other specificities make comparisons between even 
Turkey and Iran problematic, much less with Russia and 
China. 
Nevertheless, there is meaningful overlap, I argue, in 
China, Russia, Iran, and Turkey’s trajectories. The family 
resemblance emanates from their common experience 
as “revisionist former empires.” This feature matters 
because imperial legacies, both real and imagined, shape 
national projects and foreign policies (Fisher Onar 2013; 
2015; 2018).
Consider that all four are: (i) successor states to 
large and long-lived, geographically contiguous Eurasian 
2 Family resemblances are especially useful for analysts committed to causal inference. Soss (2018) develops the logic for interpretivist 
scholars, arguing that an exploratory commitment to “casing a study” rather than “studying a case” can better capture dynamics on the 
ground. Both approaches hold promise for problem-driven, cross-regional comparisons in a multipolar world. 
3 This is a feature I elsewhere theorize in juxtaposition to the colonial and post-colonial condition as the “concessionary condition” in 
reference to the imposition of  Capitulations regimes by European powers rather than full-fledged colonial control (Fisher Onar 2021). 
4 The long-nineteenth century eclipse of  these states’ ancien regimes by European powers is one source of  what Zarakol (2010) characterizes 
as “stigmatization” within international society, as is the Cold War experience of  domination by the United States (notably in Russia, where 
imperial nostalgia is arguably strongest for the Soviet rather than the Czarist period). 
empires which, (ii) since the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, and especially during the “long nineteenth 
century,” were overshadowed by European colonial 
powers (and by a Japan reinvented along European lines). 
European expansion was due to military primacy and 
emergent forms of  political and economic organization, 
namely, the nation-state and capitalist industrialization. 
But if  these features helped Europeans achieve global 
conquest, (iii) the four Eurasian empires commanded 
sufficient state capacity to retain formal sovereignty. 
This overlapping experience distinguishes China, Russia, 
Iran, and Turkey from the vast majority of  non-Western 
actors who were thoroughly subjugated.3 (iv) In response, 
moreover, reformists in each empire outmaneuvered 
traditionalists to pursue military, political, and economic 
modernization along Western lines for the paradoxical 
purpose of  defense against the West. 
(v) The four empires finally collapsed within roughly 
the same decade in the Chinese revolutions of  1911 and 
1913, the Russian revolutions of  1905 and 1917, the 
Young Turk and Kemalist revolutions of  1908 and 1923; 
and the establishment of  constitutional monarchy in 
Iran in 1925. (vi) In each case, moreover, it was internal 
rather than external agents that instituted modernizing 
authoritarian regimes. And while these regimes displayed 
great ideological variation as the states evolved over 
ensuing decades, from the foundational moment to today 
they have shared one common feature: deep ambivalence 
towards Western hegemony. (vii) Resentment of  the West 
references the humiliating experience of  eclipse,4 and 
is inculcated through school curricula, national media, 
and commemorative practices, among other nation-
building tools. (viii) Today, anti-Western sentiments—
and the promise to restore once-and-future glory—
are mobilized, in turn, for domestic or foreign policy. 
(ix) Such agendas are distinctive from post-colonial 
projects, which tend to eschew expansive claims. For 
China, Russia, Iran, and Turkey, however, the frame is 
of  manifest destiny regarding their ability—realistic or 
otherwise—to play order-setting roles in former imperial 
geographies. (x) Finally, overlapping resentment of  
the West and aspirations to power projection inform 
policy coordination (Kavalski 2010). This is evident in 
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endeavors like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
or the Astana group, via which Russia, Iran, and Turkey 
have sought to shape outcomes in Syria. Such initiatives 
hardly augur a unified block, but they provide discursive 
and institutional frameworks (Schmidt 2008) for both 
cooperation and rivalry, informed by an overlapping 
sense that the time for Western power projection across 
Eurasia is over.5 
Thus, despite obvious differences, recognizing the 
family resemblance between China, Russia, Iran, and 
Turkey as “revisionist imperial successor states” enables 
exploration of  compelling mid-range questions as the 
West retrenches: What commonalities and differences 
drive revisionist projects? How do national narratives, 
steeped in resentment of  ebbing Western hegemony, 
shape policies? How, for example, do such frames 
intertwine with status-seeking behavior? And can they 
authorize action that defies rational choice expectations? 
If  so, how do patterns at the sub- or trans-national levels 
compare with—and potentially mitigate—revisionism 
at the interstate level? What, ultimately, do our answers 
suggest for the propensity of  Eurasia’s resurgent powers 
to clash or cooperate with each other, and with Western 
counterparts? 
5 An interesting question beyond the scope of  the present essay but bearing further exploration regards how many resemblances must be 
present to constitute a legitimate basis for comparison. Soss’s (2018) work on how to reflexively “case studies” as the analyst interpolates 
between empirics, theories, and research question rather than “studying cases” as pre-existing phenomena may offer some answers. 
The toolkit of  CAS can help to at least begin 
addressing such questions in ways that do not exclude 
(re-)emerging powers’ perspectives.
Conclusion
In sum, at the dawn of  multipolarity, students 
of  world politics—including but not limited to IR 
scholars—must make sense of  non-Western diversity. 
To supplement an analytical apparatus forged in the 
West for stronger cross-regional comparisons, I have 
proposed a comparative area studies (CAS) framework 
with which to examine similarities and differences 
in the revisionist behavior of  four major actors rarely 
studied in concert. Proposing “family resemblances” as 
a tool for comparison, I show that China, Russia, Iran 
and Turkey are “revisionist former empires” (Fisher 
Onar 2013; 2018) which can be assessed vis-a-vis their 
imperial pasts, and the ways such legacies shape domestic 
and foreign policy today. By thus establishing a baseline 
for comparison, individual or collaborative research can 
explore mid-range questions regarding cooperation and 
conflict between resurgent Eurasian powers, and in their 
relations with Western counterparts. The study of  family 
resemblances across other traditionally-segmented 
area studies foci can likewise elucidate outstanding 
real-world problems. 
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